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Fabian Blanes, Cristina de Fuentes and Ruben Porcuna
Facultat D’Economia, Universitat de Valencia, Valencia, Spain
ABSTRACT
This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published
between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main
drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to
the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results
disclose a positive C.E.O. pay–performance correlation (the highest
correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a
34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies
promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver
of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to
managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both
approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that
larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the
pay–performance association. Additional analyses of moderating
factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions,
though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury
Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking
industry despite its specific regulation.
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C.E.O. compensation has been a spirited debate during the last two decades of the
past century and still remains a controversial issue (Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkan, 2012):
The global financial crisis around 2008 and high-profile corporate failures (Enron,
Worldcom, Fannie Mae, General Electric) revealed that C.E.O. pay was excessive and
failure-rewarding (De Andres, Reig, & Vallelado, 2018).
Two theories lie behind the two main, and widely discussed, drivers of C.E.O. pay,
i.e., firm performance and firm size. Under the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), the pay–performance rewarding scheme provides the
best alignment between the C.E.O. and the shareholder’s interests.
However, according to the managerial power theory (M.P.T.) (Bebchuk & Fried,
2003), executives would rather link their remuneration to firm size, over which they
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exert more influence through new investments or acquisitions (in spite of any damage
in profits) and that may also lead to more power and prestige. Prior meta-evidence
corroborates the predominance of the pay-size correlation over alternative firm’s
variables (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).
Ongoing regulatory efforts in the U.S. (e.g., S.O.X., 2002; Dodd–Frank Act, 2010)
or in the European Union (e.g., FRC, 2010; EU Directive 2013/36/E; EBA, 2015),
following the agency premises, pursue to strengthen the link between the C.E.O. com-
pensation and the firm’s short/long performance. Moreover, they aim to constrain
the discretion in C.E.O. pay and to implement equity-based components in the com-
pensation policies. They also promote: (1) empowering shareholders to monitor the
compensation policy’s compliance (say-on-pay clause); and (2) the remuneration
committee consisting exclusively of non-executive or supervisory directors.
Though, little is known about the effectiveness of these Corporate Governance (C.G.)
policies because executive agreements are opaque and the link between remuneration
and performance is very weak or difficult to establish (OECD, 2009). In addition, arch-
ival research is not conclusive: Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) document that, from
1993 until 2003, the total compensation had grown beyond the increase in firm size or
performance because equity-based compensation had increased without reducing the
non-equity part. Conversely, Chavelas (2011) report a new significant and positive
C.E.O. pay–performance association after the C.G. reform that took place in Greece in
1999. Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy (2012) also document an improvement
in the C.E.O. pay behaviour triggered by the European legislative changes.
Since prior global evidence does not consider recent governance measures (Tosi
et al., 2000) or only takes into account U.S.-based studies (Van Essen, Otten, &
Carberry, 2015), the need to further explore the current determinants of C.E.O. pay
in a multinational setting motivates this article because during the last two decades
several factors might have altered prior meta-results on C.E.O. pay: (1) the Sarbanes-
Oxley (S.O.X., 2002) and the Dodd Frank (2010) acts in the U.S., several European
Directives 2009/385, 2013/36, 2017/828 (E.U.) and the recommendations of the
Cadbury and Greenbury Reports in the U.K.; (2) new published evidence from a
wide diversity of economic and institutional environments; (3) the last global finan-
cial crisis around 2008, which prompted new C.G. recommendations (OECD, 2009)
and rules in the banking industry (EU Directive 2013/36/E; EBA, 2015); and (4)
recent sensitive analyses (Gigliotti, 2013) providing new outcomes to integrate in the
M.A. that might help to understand the C.E.O. pay behaviour.
This study aims to shed some light over this topic by integrating empirical results
on C.E.O. pay in order to assess if, from a summarised view, prior tested variables
currently impact on the C.E.O. compensation and to identify moderators that might
explain the heterogeneity in reported findings.
We perform an M.A. on 121 studies published from 1996 until mid-2018 in
J.C.R./Scopus indexed journals.
This study contributes to prior literature in a number of ways: (1) it updates and
expands the scope of prior meta-analysis (Tosi et al., 2000; Van Essen et al., 2015)
providing recent and worldwide meta-results; (2) it explores moderating factors that
might explain C.E.O. pay behaviour; and (3) it applies a Meta-Analytic Regression
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Analysis (M.A.R.A.) on the main C.E.O. pay forces providing new evidence on the
agency and M.P.T. frameworks.
This study could be of interest not only for regulators and standard setters but
also for other stakeholders, because the inverse causal relationship also applies:
Abowd (1990), after examining C.E.O. pay in 250 large firms during 1981–1986,
found that increases in the link compensation-shareholder return enhanced firm per-
formance. Thus, the efficacy of governance regulations would benefit shareholders
and third parties interested in the firm’s performance. Researches can also benefit
from a structured and systematic review of the, to date, published results.
2. Literature review and research questions
Two main drivers of C.E.O. pay, i.e., firm performance and firm size, and their related
theories (agency and managerial theory, respectively) constitute the core of the aca-
demic debate and provide the basis for the first research question of this study.
On the one hand, scholars in economics and finance commonly follow the agency
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which advocates that the
optimal contract is the one that links C.E.O. pay with performance, controlling for
firm risk measures, because it closely aligns the interests of shareholders (principal)
and the managers (agent) and, consequently, it reduces agency problems.
How to operationalise the construct performance is also debatable: The use of mar-
ket-based variables, such as return to shareholders, market to book value or Tobin’s Q
seem to better attach shareholder and manager interests. Conversely, Bertrand and
Mullaintathan (2001) claim that the stock market evolution is not entirely controlled by
managers and, therefore, the use of accounting variables, i.e., R.O.A. and R.O.E. should
be desirable. Worth noting, the extensive earnings management literature evidences the
danger of employing accounting measures that might suffer from manipulation.
Nevertheless, vast literature documents that pay–performance relationship in pri-
vately held firms is weak (e.g., Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al. 2010; Banghøj,
Gabrielsen, Petersen, & Plenborg, 2010) and limited evidence corroborates the agency
postulates (Banker, Darrough, Huang & Plehn-Dujowich, 2012).
On the other hand, rather than contradicting the agency theory, the M.P.T.
explains why the C.E.O. compensation is, in many cases, part of the problem, rather
than the solution itself (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 2004) and the reason for a pay-size
correlation higher than the pay–performance one (Tosi et al., 2000; Van Essen et al.,
2015). Executives prefer to link their remuneration to the firm size because they exert
more control over the firm growth (through new investments and/or acquisitions)
and managing bigger firms also leads to more power and prestige. In addition, the
increasing organisational complexities and human capital needs of growing compa-
nies seem to better justify their remuneration (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006).
Then, C.E.O.’s preferences (higher pay and lower pay–performance association)
would prevail upon the shareholder’s ones (lower pay and higher pay–performance
association) in those firms with weaker governance mechanisms and higher C.E.O.
power over-the-board. In this context, C.E.O.s might influence board decisions on
the rewarding agreements that are prone to satisfy C.E.O.s rather than shareholder’s
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interests. Hence, remuneration might be higher and tighter to firm size than it should
be desirable.
In consequence, according to M.P.T., we expect ‘good’ boards, that is, boards that
are not too big to face problems of coordination and communication (Jensen, 1993;
Yermack, 1996); active (Vafeas, 1999) and independent (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Core,
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999) result in less C.E.O. pay and higher pay–performance
association. However, some studies reported a positive association between Board
Independence and C.E.O. pay because the external members seem to be more
influenced by C.E.O.s (Wade, O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; Lambert, Larcker, &
Weigelt, 1993; Boyd, 1994). In this vein, C.E.O. duality (C.E.O. that also chairs the
board) is also expected to influence on the rewarding agreements.
Researchers have also explored a wide assortment of C.E.O.-related variables:
Commonly, C.E.O. Age and C.E.O. Tenure control for the superior skill management
associated with higher experience and expertise that triggers, ultimately, higher execu-
tive compensation.
Ownership concentration is negatively associated with C.E.O. pay, because a high
number of shareholders hinders a good coordination and supervisory function
(Schwalbach, 1990; Core et al., 1999). The relationship between firm’s leverage and
C.E.O. pay also commonly turns up to be negative, because financial institutions
refuse financing firms without minimal governance principles (Jensen, 1986).
However, empirical evidence confirming the M.P.T. is not conclusive (Murphy,
2002). For instance, the simultaneous increase in C.E.O. pay and either the increase
in the board independence (Conyon, 2006; Hall & Murphy, 2003) or shortened
C.E.O. tenure (Kaplan, 2008) raise doubts over managerial premises. Conversely,
Core et al. (1999) concluded that C.E.O. earns greater compensation when
governance structures are less effective.
The M.A.s provided by Tosi et al. (2000) and Van Essen et al. (2015) conclude
that firm size explained more significantly the variance in total C.E.O. pay than per-
formance measures. This may support the transcendence of managerial preferences
supported by M.P.T.
However, none of them includes relevant governance measures (Dodd–Frank Act
of 2010, Section 952; FRC, 2010 or E.U. Directive 2013/36/E) and the research con-
ducted by Van Essen et al. (2015) is only focused on U.S. firms. Therefore, since this
study aims to update and test in a multinational setting the M.P.T./agency theory, we
posit the following research question:
RQ1: According to prior reported results, which are the variables that exhibit the highest
association with C.E.O. pay?
Moderating factors
Governance codes and regulation: the Cadbury and Greenbury reports and
the S.O.X
During the period that covers this M.A., the evolution of pay–performance might have
been shaped by the successive C.G. Codes and regulations. In particular, we explore the
influence of the following moderating factors:
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1. The issuance of C.G. recommendations. Ozkan (2011) revealed that the aim of
the British Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) Reports to more closely link
C.E.O. pay to firm performance had not been totally effective. Likewise, the
results of Girma, Thompson and Wright (2007) suggested that the impact of
Cadbury reforms had been disappointing, the pay-performance link had been
reduced, and the pay-size link had been reinforced.
2. The approval of mandatory legislation. In addition to the typical ‘complain or
explain’ approach of G.C. codes, in the U.S., mandatory legislation such as S.O.X.
(2002) might have altered the main C.E.O. pay forces. Chang, Choy, and Wan
(2012) observed, after examining 1,500 S&P firms, that S.O.X. induced to weak
alignment between shareholders and C.E.O.s. However, S.O.X. prompted a posi-
tive impact on pay–performance (Chen, Jeter, & Yang, 2015) and significant
increases in total compensation (Wang, 2010).
Due to the limited availability of publications in other countries, we restrict the
exploration to how British Cadbury and Greenbury Codes and the American S.O.X.
moderate reported findings, by investigating this research question:
RQ2: Does the issuance of the Cadbury–Greenbury Reports in the U.K./the approval of
S.O.X. in the U.S. explain the heterogeneity of prior reported results?
Financial industry
In the aftermaths of the financial crisis, in order to restore trust in the financial
industry (De Bondt, 2013), among other measures, authorities have released new rules
and guidelines on C.E.O. remuneration practices in the banking industry (EU
Directive 2013/36/E; EBA, 2015), because financial institutions were paying bonuses
to the managers responsible for the banks’ collapse. As a consequence of those
measures, De Andres et al. (2018) document a significant increase (88%) in the fixed
remuneration over variable pay in 2014 compared to 2013.
Since the banking industry is subject to specific regulation, their published results
might offer homogeneity. However, in most studies, the sample does not specify
whether they include the financial industry or not and, therefore, we cannot disentan-
gle the correlation coefficients of the banking industry from the remaining industries.
Thus, we explore the following research question in order to identify whether the
C.E.O. pay drivers are homogeneous in the financial sector:
RQ3: Does the industry (financial vs total industry) explain the heterogeneity of prior
reported results?
Dependent variables
C.E.O. pay investigations have explored the two components of the Total compensa-
tion, that is, Cash and Non-cash components, the latter pursuing to increase pay–per-
formance sensitivity. However, Buck, Liu, and Skovoroda (2008) confirmed that,
while increasing C.E.O.’s total rewards, the presence of non-cash incentives is
associated with reductions in pay–performance sensitivity.
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Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) also split the dependent variable into C.E.O. com-
pensation and Executive compensation and concluded that both variables were corre-
lated, revealing possible problems of complicity inside the companies.
In consequence, we have explored whether the operationalisation of the construct
C.E.O. pay through the above mentioned variables also moderate prior findings,
through the following research question:
RQ4: Does the operationalisation of the dependent variable (i.e., C.E.O. vs Executive and
Cash vs Non-cash compensation) explain the heterogeneity of prior reported results?
3. Sample and meta-analytical procedures
3.1. Sample of study
This M.A. covers archival research written in English, published between January
1996 and July 2018 and included in several databases and editorial sources such as
I.S.I., W.o.S., ScienceDirect, Dialnet, Emerald and S.S.R.N. By using the keywords
‘pay–performance’, ‘C.E.O. compensation’, ‘C.E.O. pay’, ‘executive compensation’,
‘compensation performance’, ‘pay sensitivity’ and ‘pay elasticity’, the initial search
reported 1,343 articles. After discarding duplicates and studies from different subjects,
the initial sample consists of 225 articles. Table 1 displays the exclusion criteria which
trigger a final sample of 104 publications. In some publications there are more than
one statistical analysis over independent samples that are suitable for the M.A.
Hence, the meta-data is nourished by the results of 121 regressions executed over
either absolute values (98) or incremental values (23) of the exploratory variables.
The final sample (details in Table 2) covers a wide range of countries.
Unsurprisingly, the Anglo-Saxon countries1 (U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada) predominate
(49 studies) being the U.S., the most analysed environment (31 investigations). In
second place, the continental Europe is the focus of 33 studies. Finally, in the Asian
region, China heads the list (12 studies out of 30).
The vast majority of studies (81 out of 104) cover periods prior to the 2008 global
financial crisis and only 23 investigations explore samples collected during and after
this event.
Table 1. Sample selection process.
Number of publications %
Results offered by keywords search 1,343
Studies from different areas 1,118
Initial sample 225 100
Criteria leading to exclusion of publications
 Not indexed in JCR/SCOPUS index 33 14.67
 Dependent variable is not executive/C.E.O. compensation 26 11.56
 Results non-transformable into r values 2 0.89
 Different model/approach to executive pay 37 16.44
 Theoretical and narrative articles 23 10.22
Final sample of publications 104 46.22
 Studies performed over absolute values of independent variables 98
 Studies performed over incremental values of independent variables 23
Final sample of studies conforming the M.A. 121
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Table 2. Sample distribution by author.
Authors Date Journal Period Country Size
Adithipyangkul 2011 Asia Pacific Journal
of Management
1999–2004 China 3,706





1997 Managerial Finance 1989–1993 U.S.
(commercial banks)
245
Al-Najjar, B. 2017 Tourism Management 2003–2012 U.K. (travel & leisure) 260
Alves, Barbosa,
and Morais















2012 Review of Managerial Science 2005–2008 Germany 928










2012 The Accounting Review 1993–2006 U.S. 15,512






2007 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 1993–1997 Japan 750
Bebchuck and Grinstein 2006 Oxford Review of
Economic Policy
1993–2003 U.S. 15,397





2006 Journal of Corporate Finance 1992–2001 U.S. 5,923
Brockman, Lee,
and Salas
2016 Journal of Corporate Finance 1996–2007 U.S. 10,017
Brunello, Graziano,
and Parigi
2001 International Journal of
Industrial Organization
2000–2001 Italy 298
Buachoom 2017 Asian Review of Accounting 2000–2014 Thailand 5,911
Buck, Liu,
and Skorovoda
2008 Journal of International
Business Studies
1997–1998 U.K. 1,602







2008 Managerial Finance 1996–2002 U.S. 286
Canarella and Nourayi 2008 Managerial and
Decision Economics
1997–2002 U.S. 594
Cao, Pan, and Tian 2011 Journal of Corporate Finance 2002–2007 China 3,286
Chalevas and Tzovas 2010 The International Journal
of Accounting
2000–2003 Greece 117
Chang, Choy, and Wan 2012 Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting
1994–2005 U.S. 4,714
Chen, Jeter, and Yang 2015 Journal of Accounting and
Public Policy,
1993–2005 U.S. 6,930
Cheng and Firth 2006 Managerial and
Decision Economics
1994–2002 China (Hong Kong) 3,024
Chung, Judge, and Li, 2015 Journal of Corporate Finance 2005–2009 Taiwan 4,930
Conyon and He 2011 Journal of Corporate Finance, 2001–2005 China 5,928
Conyon
and Schwalbach
2000 Long Range Planning 1968–1994 Germany 1,246
(continued)
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 7
Table 2. Continued.
Authors Date Journal Period Country Size
Conyon, Peck,
and Sadler
2000 Managerial Finance 1985–1995 U.K. 293
Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker
1997 Journal of Financial Economics 1982–1984 U.S. 495
Correa and Lel 2016 Journal of Financial Economics 2002–2012 Worldwide 23,127
Crespı-Cladera
and Gispert
2003 Labour 1990–1995 Spain 306
Croci, Gonenc,
and Ozkan
2012 Journal of Banking & Finance 2001–2008 Continental Europe 3,731
Cu~nat and Guadalupe 2009 Journal of Banking & Finance 1994,1999 U.S. (banking, financial) 13,055
Davila and Penalva 2007 Review of Accounting Studies 1993–2002 U.S. 6,537
Doucoulagios et al 2007 Corporate Governance: An
International Review
1992–2005 Australia (banking) 141
Duffhues and Kabir 2008 Journal of Multinational
Financial Management
1998–2001 Netherlands 521
Duong and Evans 2015 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2006–2010 Australia 563
Duru and Iyengar 1999 Managerial Finance 1992–1995 U.S. (electric util. Ind.) 225
Edwards 2009 Economics of Governance 1989–1993 Germany 1,145
Elsayed and Eldarban 2018 Journal of Applied
Accounting Research
2010–2014 U.K. 1,422
Elston and Goldberg 2003 Journal of Banking & Finance, 1970–1986 Germany 1,365
Eriksson 2005 Economics of Transition 1999–2000 Czech Republic 446
Eriksson and Lausten 2000 Scandinavian Journal
of Management,
1993–1994 Denmark 120








Firth, Fung, and Rui 2006 Journal of Corporate Finance 1998–2000 China 1,098
Gao and Li 2015 Journal of Corporate Finance 1999–2011 U.S. 52,898
Ghosh 2006 Emerging Markets Finance
and Trade
1997–1992 India 600






2007 The Manchester School 1981–1996 U.K. 2,891
Gu and Choi 2004 Journal of Hospitality &
Tourism Research
1995–1999 U.S. (casino industry) 101
Hall and Liebman 1998 The Quarterly Journal
of Economics
1980–1985 U.S. 5,680
He 2008 Journal of Business Venturing 1998–2002 U.S. 4,344
Herdan
and Szczepanska
2011 Foundations of Management 2007–2010 Poland 30
Hermalin and Wallace 2001 Journal of Financial Economics 1988–1993 U.S. (saving and loans) 104
Izan, Sidhu, and Taylor 1998 Corporate Governance: An
International Review
1987–1992 Australia 587





2016 Journal of Contemporary
Accounting & Economics
1999–2013 India 5,045
Jones and Kato 1996 Labour Economics 1989–1992 Bulgaria 812
Kato y Kubo 2006 Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies
1986–1995 Japan 118
Ke 2012 Review of Accounting Studies 2003–2004 China (Hong Kong) 457
Kim, Kato, and Lee 2004 Economic development and
cultural challenge
1998–2001 Japan 543
Kirsten and Toit 2018 South African Journal of
Economic and
Management Sciences
2006–2015 South Africa 420
Leone 2006 1993–2003 U.S. 9,858
(continued)
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Table 2. Continued.





2007 Research in International
Business and Finance
2000–2001 China 298
Lin 2004 Asian Review of Accounting 1998 Taiwan 201
Lin, Liao, and Chang 2011 Total Quality Management 2004–2006 Taiwan (high-
tech business)
1,175
Luo 2015 Journal of the Economics
of Business
2005–2012 China 214
Luo and Jackson 2011 Global Business and
Finance Review
2001–2009 China (financial firms) 108





2006 Accounting & Finance 1990–1999 Australia 2,199
Merino, Manzaneque,
and Banegas





2008 Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies
1993–1997 U.S. 2,399
Murphy and Conyon 2000 Economic Journal 1997 U.S. 1,665
Nourayi and Daroca 2008 Managerial Finance 1996–2002 U.S. 663

















2006 Economic and Political Weekly 2004–2005 India 409
Raithatha and Komera 2016 IIMB Management Review 2002–2012 India 12,799
Randøy and Nielsen 2002 Journal of Management
and Governance
1998 Norway 224



























2018 Applied Economics 2005–2012 Pakistan 1,508





2017 Research in International
Business and Finance
2009–2013 EU and Switzerland 1,338
Su 2012 Asian Business & Management 1999–2007 China 41,180
Sun, Wei, and Huang 2013 Review of Accounting
and Finance







2008 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2001–2003 Philippines 273
(continued)
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3.2. Research design
All variables related to size, leverage, performance and C.G. characteristics of the
companies are specified in Appendix 1.
This study applies M.A. techniques introduced by Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson
(1982) as it follows:
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients (r)2 reported in the studies of the sample are
the data source to estimate the global effect size of the relationship between
executive-pay and the explanatory variables.3 In order to assess those coefficients,
the scale developed by Cohen (1988) has been applied.
2. We assumed homogeneity in the results if 75% or more of the observed variance
was explained by the sampling error and if the statistic of the Q test was not sig-
nificant. Otherwise, when effect magnitudes were heterogeneous, we tried to
identify the moderating variables chosen from our previous narrative review.
3. The so-called ‘filed drawer problem’4 (or publication bias towards significant
results) results in higher M.A. coefficients than they should be otherwise (Wolf,
1986, p.37). In order to address this issue, we computed the Safe N
(Rosenthal, 1979).
4. To identify whether the exploratory variables significantly influence the pay–per-
formance association, we run a meta-regression following the M.A.R.A.
procedure (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) with the modifications proposed by Harbord
and Higgins (2008), which include the improvement of the algorithm for the esti-
mation of the between-study variance by residual maximum likelihood (R.E.M.L.)
and the modifications suggested by Knapp and Hartung (2003). The dependent
variable is the effect size of the association between performance and C.E.O. pay,
computed from t-statistics and degrees of freedom of primary studies
(Greene, 2008).
4. Results
4.1. Effect size of the main variables
Columns 1 to 5 in Table 3 disclose the number of published studies and the esti-
mated coefficient of the association between the explanatory variables and C.E.O. pay.
The most prolific line of investigation explores the association between firm’s
Table 2. Continued.
Authors Date Journal Period Country Size
Veliyath 1999 Journal of
Management Studies
1986–1990 U.S. (pharmaceutical) 46
Wang 2010 Journal of
Accounting Research
1998–2005 U.S. 16,165






2011 Asian Social Science 2002–2009 China (financial
enterprises)
79
Zhou 1999 Journal of Corporate Finance 1991–1994 U.S.–CANADA 2,245








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 11
performance and our variable of interest. In particular, 67 studies explore the impact
of Share return on C.E.O. pay: 40 offered a positive significant relationship, one dis-
played negative coefficient and 26 resulted in no-significant results. The correlation
coefficient offers a positive value of 0.069 included in the 95% confidence interval.
We can claim that there is no publication bias, because we would need 21,195 studies
(Safe N) with null results to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no significant effect
of Share return on C.E.O. pay. The hypothesis of homogeneity is consistently refused:
Only 5.701% of the observed variance is due to sampling error and the X2 coefficient
is significant at 1%, therefore the differences within the published outputs are due to
unobserved/underlying variables that could explain the diversity in the results. Similar
explanations apply to the remaining firm performance measures. Notably, the variable
that offers the highest correlation coefficient with C.E.O. pay is Earnings per
share (0.338).
Among the set of governance characteristics, the Board Size coefficient is positive
and significant in 22 out of 32 studies and displays the highest correlation value
(0.183). On the contrary, the more active the board the lower the C.E.O. pay (the
coefficient of Board Meetings is -0.103), although we need to be cautious in drawing
any conclusion because the number of published studies reporting on this variable is
low (nine cases) and the Safe N is also the lowest of the M.A. (25 studies).
Ownership concentration is also negatively correlated with C.E.O. pay. The remaining
C.G. characteristics (C.E.O. tenure, C.E.O. age and C.E.O. duality) display positive
coefficients although with low effect sizes (0.029, 0.023 and 0.018 respectively). As
expected, every measure of firm size displays high and positive correlation coefficients
with C.E.O. pay and the Safe N values are high. The published results are heteroge-
neous according to the percentage of variance explained and the X2 tests.
Finally, Leverage is positively related to our variable of interest, although it offers
the lowest coefficient (0.009).
According to Cohen’s (1988) scale, all the effect sizes (untabulated) are low but
earnings per share and board size (that exhibit medium values).
Panel B of Table 3 reports the M.A. results on published sensitive analyses, that is,
the regressions performed over incremental values, in order to determine the elasti-
city of C.E.O. pay in relation with the exploratory variables, following the model
developed by Murphy (1985) and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985). All coefficients in
Panel B display a significant association with C.E.O. pay, being the elasticity related
to R.O.A. and Shareholder Return the one that offers the highest values. Yet again, all
variables lack from homogeneity within published outputs due to underlying (not
considered) variables. Therefore, the exploration of moderating variables is pertinent.
4.2. Results related to moderating variables
Table 4 shows the conclusions driven by the significant results (not reported for brev-
ity) of applying the moderating factors in order to answer the research ques-
tions RQ2–RQ4.
Regarding firm performance measures, in the U.K. context, only the published out-
comes on the Share return-C.E.O. pay association and in the post-Cadbury period
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exhibit significant homogeneity. Notably, the coefficient is positive but lower than in
the pre-Cadbury group of studies (as in Girma & Thompson, 2007). In the same
vein, in the U.S. setting, the R.O.E.-C.E.O. pay association is higher in the pre-S.O.X.
than in the following years although only the results in the pre-S.O.X. period are
homogeneous. Thus, our results do not suggest a clear effectiveness of the governance
measures in increasing the pay–performance association.
None of the tested variables moderates firm’s size measures but total industry (the
group that excludes the publications focused on the banking industry). Hence, despite
the specific banking regulation, we failed to find a consistent behaviour of any
variable attached to C.E.O. pay in the financial industry.
Within the set of governance characteristics, the study reveals homogeneity only in
the results related to: (1) C.E.O. Ownership–C.E.O. pay association with a higher
coefficient than the one referred to the pre-S.O.X. period; and (2) the Executive
(executive positions other than C.E.O.) pay and the board meetings.
Additionally, in undisclosed tables, we have performed the M.A. using additional
moderating variables such as the geographical region (E.U. vs Non-E.U. countries or
U.S. vs non-U.S. based studies) the legislative setting according to both Anglo-Saxon
vs Non-Anglo-Saxon countries and Civil vs Code Law countries, and type of compen-
sation (Total compensation vs Cash compensation), but we failed to find homoge-
neous groups.
4.3. Results of the meta-regression
We run the meta-regression on a model where the dependent variable consists of the
effect size of the C.E.O. pay–performance association, being the independent variables all
the determinants considered in the meta-analysis and displayed in Table 3. The set of
exploratory variables adopts a dichotomy form, which equals 1 if they are included in the
models tested in the primary studies and 0 otherwise. In addition, we also include some
variables such as the Number of variables in the tested regressions and the Median year
sample window, both in absolute values (as in Van Essen et al., 2015).
MARA results (Table 5) indicate that the association between performance and
C.E.O. pay is moderated when the firm’s size and the number of board independent
members are included, showing both positive and significant coefficients. That is, the
Table 4. Summary of Hunter and Smith meta-analysis using moderating factors.
Homogeneous group Sign Comparison with the non-homogeneous group
Firm performance
Share return Post-Cadbury þ <
R.O.E. U.S. pre-S.O.X. þ >
Firm size
Total Sales Total Industry þ <
Total Assets Total Industry þ <
Log (total assets) Total Industry þ <
Market Capitalisation Total Industry þ <
Governance characteristics
Board Meeting Executive compensation þ >
C.E.O. Ownership U.S. pre-S.O.X. þ >
Variables described in Appendix 1.
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larger companies and the more independent boards strengthen the association
between firm’s performance and C.E.O. pay.
Moreover, ownership concentration, although not significant, displays a positive
association with C.E.O. pay–performance relationship (contrary to Bebchuk & Fried,
2004). Thus, further research on this field would help to a better understanding of
the ownership structure and C.E.O. power over the board.
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Discussion of the main effects results
We extend prior M.A. (Tosi et al., 2000) by analyzing results published in the last
two decades that have witnessed a worldwide proliferation of Governance codes.
This study contributes to the agency theory–M.P.T. debate, from a global perspec-
tive, in the following terms: Our results reveal that in absolute values: (1) the pay–
performance association is significant although all effect sizes are low but earnings
per share that exhibits a medium value (according to the scale by Cohen, 1988); and
(2) firm size still displays the highest correlation with C.E.O. pay (around 44%).
However, deeper insights from elasticity analyses suggest that C.E.O. pay is more sen-
sitive to variations in performance variables (both market and accounting based
measures) than to firm size changes. A plausible explanation for this finding is that
ongoing governance measures are modifying rewarding schemes though they exhibit
stickiness to size variables due to the organisational complexity and risk exposure of
large firms (Diez Esteban, Garcıa-Gomez and Lopez-Iturriaga, 2013).
Since the M.A. does not test the causal effect, deeper insights through M.A.R.A.
results also support that pay–performance increases with board independence (as
agency theorists predict) and firm size (i.e., preserving C.E.O.s interests according to
M.P.T.). Hence, our results reconcile rather than alternate both theories.
Table 5. M.A.R.A. procedure using effect sizes of performance-compensation association.
Variables Coef. t-statistic
Market performance 0.0251 (1.029)
Size 0.0608 (1.762)
Board size 0.0151 (0.508)
Board meetings 0.0368 (1.007)
Board independence 0.0643 (2.058)
Ownership concentration 0.0010 (0.027)
C.E.O. duality 0.0311 (1.211)
C.E.O. ownership 0.0143 (0.537)
C.E.O. tenure 0.0170 (0.585)
C.E.O. age 0.0029 (0.090)
Leverage 0.0267 (1.042)
Number of variables in regression 0.0158 (1.565)
Median year sample window 0.0011 (0.704)
Constant 2.1948 (0.726)
R2 0.02
Observations (number of effect sizes) 98
Qres (p-value) 2,5 e06 (0.000)
Qmodel (p-value) 2,5 e06 (0.000)
Notes: Q is the homogeneity test, Qres is based on the residual homogeneity statistic and Qmodel is based on the
R.E.M.L. log likelihood.
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Moderator variables offer miscellaneous results and do not support robust conclu-
sions. They barely suggest: (1) that governance measures (in particular the Cadbury
Code and S.O.X.) had, if any, a detrimental effect in the pay–performance association;
and (2) the C.E.O. pay in the banking industry does not offer a homogeneous pat-
tern. In addition, dichotomies related to institutional or geographical regions, such as
Anglo-Saxon vs Non-Anglo-Saxon; E.U. vs non-E.U.; Civil vs Common Law countries
failed to further explain heterogeneity in prior findings.
These results help to understand the somehow contradictory empirical evidence and
to provide solid foundations for future hypotheses developments. This contribution is
also relevant to the regulatory bodies and standard setters because our results reveal that,
in order to harmonise shareholders and managers’ interests, the pay–performance
association still needs further factual implementation of governance measures.
Limitations and further research
Among the limitations of this study, the use of meta-analytic structural equations
could offer additional results and reduce the possibility of omitted variables bias.
Endogeneity concerns could also be addressed, in particular, how remuneration poli-
cies influence performance (De Andres et al., 2018).
Future research should be devoted to test alternative theories. Also, additional
investigation over unexplored areas, such as Latin America or Russia, might help to
understand peculiarities and differences of governance systems across countries.
Notes
1. As identified in http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095413570
2. The r correlation coefficient was reported in 35 studies. In the remaining cases, t-statistics,
b parameters, p-values or standard errors were used to estimate partial correlation
(following Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001).
3. When necessary, in order to avoid problems generated by high standard deviation in p
values, we computed the Pearson correlation coefficient normalised by Fisher’s
Transformation (Zr).
4. Studies with ‘no significant results’ are likely unpublished due to either the editors’
preferences or the researches inhibition from sending papers when they failed to verify the
formulated hypotheses.
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Share Return Total return of a stock to an investor. Share price appreciation plus dividends
paid to shareholders.
Return on assets (R.O.A.) Net income divided by total assets
Return on equity (R.O.E.) Net income divided by total equity
Market to Book Value Firm’s market value divided by the firm’s book value
Earnings per share Net profit after taxes divided by the number of equity shares.
Tobin’s Q ratio Book value of total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the
market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets.
Firm Size
Total Sales Absolute value of firm’s revenues
Log (Sales) Natural logarithm of firm’s revenues
Total Assets Absolute value of firm’s total assets
Log (Assets) Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets
Market Capitalisation Total market value of a company’s outstanding shares.
Firm Characteristics
Leverage Total debt divided by Equity
Governance Characteristics
Board Size Number of Board of Director members
Board Meetings Number of Board of Directors meetings per year
Board Independence Number of Non-executive board members
Ownership Concentration The amount of stock owned by individual investors and large-block shareholders
C.E.O. duality The C.E.O. is also the Chairman of the Board.
C.E.O. Ownership The C.E.O. earns any stock-based compensation (stocks or options)
C.E.O. tenure Number of years of C.E.O. in the firms
C.E.O. age Experience of C.E.O.
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